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Bond market discipline of banks: is the market tough enough?

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Author Info
Donald P. Morgan
Kevin J. Stiroh

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Abstract

As the banking business grows more complex, government supervisors of banks seem increasingly willing to share the role of policing bank risk with private investors, especially bondholders. This paper investigates the disciplinary role of markets using bond spreads, ratings, and bank portfolio data on over 4,100 new bonds issued between 1993 and 1998, including almost 600 bond issues by banks and bank holding companies. We find that the bond spread/rating relationship is the same for the bank issues as for nonbank issues, especially among the investment grade issues. This suggests that the bond market prices public measures of bank risk efficiently. Investors also look beyond the ratings, as spreads on the bank issues depend on the underlying portfolio of assets and loans. Banks contemplating a shift into riskier activities like trading, for example, can expect to pay higher spreads as a result. That is market discipline. The market, however, appears relatively soft on bigger banks and less transparent banks, pointing to possible slippage in the disciplinary mechanism for banks either considered too big to fail or too hard to understand by the bond market.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 95.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:95

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Related research
Keywords: Bank supervision ; Bonds ; Risk management;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, 1994. "The credit rating industry," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sum, pages 1-26.
  2. Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998. "The Paradox Of Liquidity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 733-771, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Gorton, Gary & Santomero, Anthony M, 1990. "Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated Debt," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(1), pages 119-28, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mark J. Flannery & Simon H. Kwan & M. Nimalendran, 1997. "Market evidence on the opaqueness of banking firms' assets," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 470-485.
    Other versions:
  5. Avery, Robert B & Belton, Terrence M & Goldberg, Michael A, 1988. "Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(4), pages 597-610, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
  7. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September. [Downloadable!]
  8. George G. Kaufman, 1999. "Banking and currency crises and systemic risk: a taxonomy and review," Working Paper Series WP-99-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  9. Donald P. Morgan & Ian Toll, 1997. "Bad debt rising," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Mar. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Andrea Sironi, 2000. "Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: evidence from subordinated debt issues," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-40, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  2. Adam Ashcraft & Hoyt Bleakley, 2006. "On the market discipline of informationally opaque firms: evidence from bank borrowers in the federal funds market," Staff Reports 257, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  3. Adam B. Ashcraft, 2006. "Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from the regulatory capital mix," Staff Reports 244, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  4. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000. "Subordinated debt and bank capital reform," Working Paper 2000-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, 2004. "Market discipline in banking reconsidered: the roles of funding manager decisions and deposit insurance reform," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-53, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  6. Andrea Sironi, 2001. "Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: evidence from subordinated debt issues," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 366-384.
  7. Caprio, Gerard & Honohan, Patrick, 2004. "Can the unsophisticated market provide discipline?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3364, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hartarska, Valentina, 2006. "Rating in Microfinance: Cross-Country Evidence," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25506, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  9. Reint Gropp & Jukka Vesala & Giuseppe Vulpes, 2002. "Equity and bond market signals as leading indicators of bank fragility," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Greg Caldwell, 2005. "Subordinated Debt and Market Discipline in Canada," Working Papers 05-40, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  11. Mark J. Flannery & Kasturi P. Rangan, 2002. "Market forces at work in the banking industry: evidence from the capital buildup of the 1990s," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May. [Downloadable!]
  12. Donald P. Morgan, 2000. "Rating risks: risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry," Staff Reports 105, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  13. Robert R. Bliss, 2001. "Market discipline and subordinated debt: a review of some salient issues," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q I, pages 24-45. [Downloadable!]
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