Payment system settlement and bank incentives
AbstractIn this paper we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments. Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves but increases moral hazard problems. The "put option" value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. ; Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default. Net settlement becomes more attractive relative to gross settlement if bank assets have to be liquidated at less than book value.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its series Proceedings with number 537.
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (1997 : 33rd) ; Technology : //www.policy.implications.for.the.future.of.financial.services/com.
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Other versions of this item:
- Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, . "Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-32, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 1996. "Payment system settlement and bank incentives," Working Paper 96-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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- Robert Eisenbeis, 1987. "Eroding market imperfections: implications for financial intermediaries, the payments system, and regulatory reform," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 19-62.
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