“The Voracity Effect” and Climate Change: The Impact of Clean Technologies
AbstractWe show that a technological breakthrough that reduces CO2 emissions per output can exacerbate the climate change problem: countries may respond by raising their emissions resulting in an increase of the stock of pollution that may reduce welfare. Using parameter values based on empirical evidence we obtain that any 'new technology' that reduces the emissions of CO2 per dollar of GDP by less than 76% from their current level is welfare reducing. Developing clean technologies as well as transferring “cleaner” technologies to developing countries make a global post-Kyoto agreement over the control of emissions all the more urgent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2011.05.
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Transboundary Pollution; Renewable Resource; Climate Change; Clean Technologies; Differential Games;
Other versions of this item:
- BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & RAY CHAUDHURI, Amrita, 2010. "'The Voracity Effect' and Climate Change : The Impact of Clean Technologies," Cahiers de recherche 16-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2010. "'The Voracity Effect' and Climate Change: The Impact of Clean Technologies," Discussion Paper 2010-97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2011-02-12 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-02-12 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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