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Regulating transmission in a spatial oligopoly: a numerical illustration for Belgium

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Author Info
Bert Willems () (K.U.Leuven, C.E.S., Energy, Transport and Environment)
Guido Pepermans () (K.U.Leuven, C.E.S., Energy, Transport and Environment)

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Abstract

This paper introduces strategic behavior of the electricity network operator in a congested network with imperfect competition for generation. It models a two stage Stackelberg game. First, the network operator sets transmission prices, then generators set output and sales. Several scenarios for the generation market structure and the behavior of the network operator are compared numerically. The calibration of the numerical model is based on data of the Belgian electricity market.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment in its series Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series with number ete0314.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0314

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Web page: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ew/academic/energmil
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Related research
Keywords: Regulation; Transmission; Electricity; Cournot; Numerical model; Security constraints; MPEC; loadflow; Belgium;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Aleksandr Rudkevich & Max Duckworth & Richard Rosen, 1998. "Modeling Electricity Pricing in a Deregulated Generation Industry: The Potential for Oligopoly Pricing in a Poolco," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 19(3), pages 19-48.
  2. William W. Hogan, 1997. "A Market Power Model with Strategic Interaction in Electricity Networks," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 18(4), pages 107-142.
  3. Frank A. Wolak & Robert H. Patrick, 2001. "The Impact of Market Rules and Market Structure on the Price Determination Process in the England and Wales Electricity Market," NBER Working Papers 8248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Cardell, Judith B. & Hitt, Carrie Cullen & Hogan, William W., 1997. "Market power and strategic interaction in electricity networks," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 109-137, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Steven Stoft, 1997. "The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry," NBER Working Papers 6293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bolle, Friedel, 1992. "Supply function equilibria and the danger of tacit collusion : The case of spot markets for electricity," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 94-102, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Christopher R. Knittel, 1999. "Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 20(4), pages 65-88.
  9. Green, Richard J, 1996. "Increasing Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2), pages 205-16, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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