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Electricity Generation with Looped Transmission Networks: Bidding to an ISO

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Author Info
Hu, X.
Ralph, D.
Ralph, E.K.
Bardsley, P.
Ferris, M.C.

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Abstract

This paper uses a bi-level game to model markets for delivery of electrical power on looped transmission networks. It analyzes the effectiveness of an independent system operator (ISO) when generators (and, in some cases, retailers) with market power bid a single parameter of their linear supply (demand) functions to the ISO. The ISO, taking these bids at face value, maximizes welfare subject to transmission constraints. We find that equilibrium outcomes are sensitive to firms’ strategy spaces: 1. In the presence of transmission congestion and loop flows, supply function equilibria (SFE) are not bounded from above by Cournot equilibria, so Cournot outcomes may be more effcient than SFE, a difference that can be accentuated by increasing the number of rivals at a given node; 2. Allocation of transmission rights to generators can reduce effciency; and 3. Countervailing power on the part of buyers can lower effciency.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0470.

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Length: 31
Date of creation: Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0470

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Related research
Keywords: electricity market nodal pricing locational marginal pricing supply function equilibria bilevel game bilevel program

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Computational Techniques
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Berry, Carolyn A. & Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Meroney, William A. & O'Neill, Richard P. & StewartJr, William R., 1999. "Understanding how market power can arise in network competition: a game theoretic approach," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 139-158, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Green, Richard, 1999. "The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 107-24, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hobbs, Benjamin F, et al, 2000. "Evaluation of a Truthful Revelation Auction in the Context of Energy Markets with Nonconcave Benefits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 5-32, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ehrenmann, A. & Neuhoff, K., 2003. "A Comparison of Electricity Market Designs in Networks," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0341, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  5. Cho, In-Koo, 2003. " Competitive Equilibrium in a Radial Network," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 438-60, Autumn.
  6. Chao, Hung-Po & Peck, Stephen, 1996. "A Market Mechanism for Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 25-59, July.
  7. Cardell, Judith B. & Hitt, Carrie Cullen & Hogan, William W., 1997. "Market power and strategic interaction in electricity networks," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 109-137, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik Morch & Harbord, David, 1993. "Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 531-46, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Hogan, William W, 1992. "Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 211-42, September.
  10. Richard Green, 2001. "Markets for Electricity in Europe," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(3), pages 329-345.
  11. Richard Gilbert & Karsten Neuhoff & David Newbery, 2003. "Mediating Market Power in Electricity Networks," Industrial Organization 0303008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Denton, Michael J. & Rassenti, Stephen J. & Smith, Vernon L., 2001. "Spot market mechanism design and competitivity issues in electric power," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 435-453, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Willems, B.R.R. & Rumiantseva, I. & Weigt, H., 2007. "Cournot versus Supply Functions: What Does the Data tell us?," Discussion Paper 2007-023, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Hu, X. & Ralph, R., 2006. "Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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