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Game Theoretical Approach to Regulate the Public-Owned River Water Utilities: A Case Study of Cauvery River

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  • Zareena Begum Irfan
  • Jeeva Mary Jacob

Abstract

Management of regulated water systems has become increasingly complex due to rapid socio-economic growth and environmental changes in river basins over recent decades. This paper focusses on the public-owned river water utility river basin conflicts that are increasingly marked by a heightened attention because of the political discourse surrounding it. In order to promote cooperation and resolve conflicts between states in a basin, policy makers must vigorously try to get the dialogue process on and avoid deadlocks in the process.

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  • Zareena Begum Irfan & Jeeva Mary Jacob, 2016. "Game Theoretical Approach to Regulate the Public-Owned River Water Utilities: A Case Study of Cauvery River," Working Papers id:10746, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:10746
    Note: Institutional Papers
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues," Working Papers 2005.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Bardhan, Pranab, 1993. "Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 633-639, April.
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