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Social Identity and Group Lending

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Author Info
Prabirendra Chatterjee
Sudipta, Sarangi

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Abstract

The success of joint liability programs depends on nature and composition of borrowing groups. Group formation is a costly process and in our model these costs vary with the social identity of group partners. We show that risk heterogeneity in a borrowing group may arise due to the social identity of the agents. The presence of caste and gender bias may not resolve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems created by information asymmetry between the borrowers and the lender. We also find that with costly group formation and state verification, individual liability lending may be better than joint liability lending. Thus ignoring social identity and group formation costs can lead to the failure of a joint liability program. Finally, the paper also suggests that targeting different social groups requires the use of a menu of joint liability costs.

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Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number UWEC-2005-06-R.

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Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2005-06-r

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Guinnane, Timothy W., 1999. "The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 195-228, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Marcel Fafchamps & Susan Lund, 2000. "Risk-Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines," Economics Series Working Papers 010, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Khandker, S.R. & Khalily, B. & Khan, Z., 1995. "Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability," World Bank - Discussion Papers 306, World Bank.
  4. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2000. "Participation In Heterogeneous Communities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 847-904, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Udry, Christopher, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in Northern Nigeria," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 495-526, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Beatriz Armendáriz de Aghion & Jonathan Morduch, 2000. "Microfinance Beyond Group Lending," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(2), pages 401-420, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Marcel Fafchamps, 2002. "Returns to social network capital among traders," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 173-206, April.
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  8. Rahman, Aminur, 1999. "Micro-credit initiatives for equitable and sustainable development: Who pays?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 67-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. De Weerdt, Joachim, 2002. "Risk-Sharing and Endogenous Network Formation," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  10. Bardhan, Pranab, 1993. "Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 633-639, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "The Social Context of Economic Decisions," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000315, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Akerlof, George A, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Morduch, Jonathan, 1999. "The role of subsidies in microfinance: evidence from the Grameen Bank," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 229-248, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Murgai, Rinku & Winters, Paul & Sadoulet, Elisabeth & Janvry, Alain de, 2002. "Localized and incomplete mutual insurance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 245-274, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Amin, Sajeda & Rai, Ashok S. & Topa, Giorgio, 2003. "Does microcredit reach the poor and vulnerable? Evidence from northern Bangladesh," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 59-82, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Prabirendra Chatterjee & Sudipta Sarangi, 2005. "Enforcement with Costly Group Formation," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 15(9), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  2. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2006. "Group-lending with sequential financing, contingent renewal and social capital," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 06-01, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Fernando Aguiar & Pablo Branas-Garza & Maria Paz Espinosa & Luis M. Miller, 2007. "Personal Identity in the Dictator Game," Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics 2007-007, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
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