Social Identity and Group Lending
AbstractThe success of joint liability programs depends on nature and composition of borrowing groups. Group formation is a costly process and in our model these costs vary with the social identity of group partners. We show that risk heterogeneity in a borrowing group may arise due to the social identity of the agents. The presence of caste and gender bias may not resolve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems created by information asymmetry between the borrowers and the lender. We also find that with costly group formation and state verification, individual liability lending may be better than joint liability lending. Thus ignoring social identity and group formation costs can lead to the failure of a joint liability program. Finally, the paper also suggests that targeting different social groups requires the use of a menu of joint liability costs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Louisiana State University in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2004-01.
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- Prabirendra Chatterjee & Sudipta, Sarangi, . "Social Identity and Group Lending," Working Papers UWEC-2005-06-R, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Prabirendra Chatterjee & Sudipta Sarangi, 2004. "Social Identity and Group Lending," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 405, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-02-01 (All new papers)
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