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A framework for optimal water allocation considering water value, strategic management and conflict resolution

Author

Listed:
  • Meraj Sohrabi

    (University of Tehran)

  • Zeynab Banoo Ahani Amineh

    (Sharif University of Technology)

  • Mohammad Hossein Niksokhan

    (University of Tehran)

  • Hossein Zanjanian

    (University of Tehran)

Abstract

This paper proposes a new framework to optimize the allocation of water resources considering two perspectives of water value and strategic management which is one of the novelties of this study. After identifying agricultural, industrial, and domestic water demands, a water allocation model is developed to maximize the net benefit of water delivered to each sector. Based on the characteristics of the study area which is the Namak Lake basin, water transfer from Dez tributaries can be considered as an uncertainty depending on the climate and political issues. So, the model is initially performed without considering water transfer and then water transfer is considered to enhance the flexibility. In addition, the initial model does not assign the weights to the plain. In the novel model, weights derived from questionnaires are applied to reflect experts’ opinions and consider the priorities of the plains. Transferred water is then allocated from the strategic management perspective and the water value perspective (six possible combinations of perspectives and scenarios), and eleven independent variables are considered in the model. Also, GMCR + , the new version of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, is applied to visualize the possible scenarios and equilibrium states based on the status quo of the conflict. Based on the results, the first scenario of water value perspective is chosen which results in a significant water allocation to the industry and agriculture sectors (approximately 94% and 96%, respectively). Also, 94.6% of potable water is satisfied compared to the initial water needs. Graphical Abstract

Suggested Citation

  • Meraj Sohrabi & Zeynab Banoo Ahani Amineh & Mohammad Hossein Niksokhan & Hossein Zanjanian, 2023. "A framework for optimal water allocation considering water value, strategic management and conflict resolution," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 1582-1613, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:endesu:v:25:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s10668-022-02110-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10668-022-02110-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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