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The Mekong Game: Achieving an All-win Situation

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  • Zhenliang Liao
  • Phillip Hannam

Abstract

In recent years, there have been many quarrels among countries of the Mekong River Basin surrounding use of the water resources of that river. In particular, China’s behavior of constructing dams upstream has resulted in objections by many people in all countries downstream. Cooperative game theory has been applied to solving issues of building and utilizing dams on trans-border rivers. The central question is how to allocate the surplus benefits generated by the dams. This paper proposes to achieve an all-win situation in use of Mekong water resources through cooperation. A game named “The Mekong Game” was designed for those Ph.D. students and resource persons to play on the PROSPER.NET’s workshop in 2010. For a hypothetical case in Mekong Game, the Shapley Value Method’s results were given, which could be regarded as one of equitable results in theory, and the Mekong Game’s process and outcomes are introduced in this paper. Participants were divided into six groups representing the six involved “countries.” The process of meeting an agreement with an all-win idea was simulated through three round-table negotiations. For the hypothetical case, different set of results under different situations were compared and discussed, including no dam(s), dam(s) without cooperation, dam(s) with cooperation but without compensation and re-allocation, Shapley Value Method, and Mekong Game (bargaining and negotiation). The results reveal: although it is hard to get theoretical optimal aftermath considering other complicated factors than those can be calculated, the all-win situation is still possible through bargaining and negotiation processes, which should be much better than all-lose situation such as the current one. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Zhenliang Liao & Phillip Hannam, 2013. "The Mekong Game: Achieving an All-win Situation," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 27(7), pages 2611-2622, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:27:y:2013:i:7:p:2611-2622
    DOI: 10.1007/s11269-013-0306-3
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    2. Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu & Abdurrahman Geymen, 2014. "Transboundary Water Resources Allocation under Various Parametric Conditions: The Case of the Euphrates & Tigris River Basin," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(11), pages 3515-3538, September.
    3. Parna Parsapour-Moghaddam & Armaghan Abed-Elmdoust & Reza Kerachian, 2015. "A Heuristic Evolutionary Game Theoretic Methodology for Conjunctive Use of Surface and Groundwater Resources," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 29(11), pages 3905-3918, September.
    4. Mead Allison & Michael Ramirez & Ehab Meselhe, 2014. "Diversion of Mississippi River Water Downstream of New Orleans, Louisiana, USA to Maximize Sediment Capture and Ameliorate Coastal Land Loss," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(12), pages 4113-4126, September.

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