Fair Apportionment in the Italian Senate : Which Reform Should Be Implemented?
AbstractIn this paper we analyze the fairness of the 2007 reform proposal concerning the apportionment of the seats between the regions for the Italian Senate. Theory of power indices is used to compare the actual case with the proposed one. Two scenarios are proposed, senators belonging to the same region voting in blocks and senators voting according party lines, using both the Impartial Culture and the Impartial Anonymous Culture models. Our objective is to determine which apportionment is closer to the equal distribution of power among the citizens. In addition, we will seek for apportionments that are closer to the ideal representation than the ones proposed by politicians. We will also derive the probability that different apportionments produce a referendum paradox, i.e. exhibit a majority in the Senate different from the national popular majority.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2011-16.
Date of creation: 2011
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Power index; Banzhaf; Italian Senate; apportionment; voting paradox; Monte Carlo simulation.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-03-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-08 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
- Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, 08.
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