On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Members
AbstractEven, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting gamehave on a binary issue independent opinions, they may haveinterest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gainof influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usualindependence of votes, we first study the alliance voting powerand obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for whichthe number of players is large enough and the alliance weightremains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, wepropose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a randomgame which allows new possibilities. The validity of theasymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examinedby considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers ofthe European Union.
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Date of creation: 2007
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Publication status: Published, Social Choice and Welfare, 2007, 28, 2, 181--207
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Voting Power; Alliance;
Other versions of this item:
- Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2007. "On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 181-207, February.
- M.R. Feix & D. Lepelley & V. Merlin & J.L. Rouet, 2006. "On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200605, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
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UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
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- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00344457 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00308741 is not listed on IDEAS
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