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Targeting and Child Poverty

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  • Donni Olivier
  • Bargain Olivier

    ()
    (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise
    University College of Dublin, CHILD and IZA)

Abstract

We examine the relative merits of targeting children within the household through price subsidies and cash transfers. To do so, we model the behavior of a household composed of one adult and one child. We then show that 'favorable' distortions from price subsidies may allow redistributing toward the child and then derive the conditions under which this redistributive scheme is more e¢ cient than cash trans- fers. The framework is extended to account for possible paternalistic preferences of the social planner and for households composed of two adults with different pref- erences. Applied to a continuum of households, our approach is extended to the problem of child poverty alleviation. In contrast to the traditional view, we show that well-chosen subsidies may be more cost e¤ective than cash transfers in reducing child poverty.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2011-05.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2011-05

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Keywords: indirect taxation; child benefit; targeting; intra-household distribu- tion; social welfare; paternalism; labeling.;

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References

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Transfers to mothers may hurt children
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-05-19 14:39:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:
  1. Olivier Bargain & Olivier Donni, 2011. "Optimal Commodity Taxation and Redistribution within Households," Working Papers, School Of Economics, University College Dublin 201107, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
  2. Olivier Bargain & Olivier Donni & Prudence Kwenda, 2013. "Intrahousehold Distribution and Poverty: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire," THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise 2013-23, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  3. BARGAIN Olivier & DONNI Olivier, 2010. "The Measurement of Child Costs: A Rothbarth-Type Method Consistent with Scale Economies and Parents? Bargaining," CEPS/INSTEAD Working Paper Series 2010-30, CEPS/INSTEAD.
  4. Bargain, Olivier & Donni, Olivier & Kwenda, Prudence, 2014. "Intrahousehold distribution and poverty: Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 262-276.
  5. Olivier Bargain & Olivier Donni, 2010. "The Measurement of Child Costs: A Rothbarth-Type Method Consistent with Scale Economies," Working Papers, School Of Economics, University College Dublin 201001, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.

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