Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Response of Fishermen to Fishing Control Policies in Southern Songkhla Lake, Thailand: A Field Experiment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kunlayanee Pornpinatepong

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla)

  • Pathomwat Chantarasap

    (Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla)

  • Jumtip Seneerattanaprayul

    (Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla)

  • Wittawat Hemtanon

    (Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla)

  • Papitchaya Saelim

    (Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Game theory was used to analyze the extraction behavior of fishermen around the Southern Sonkhla Lake in Southern Thailand. The field experiments were designed based on the concept of non-cooperative game theory for investigating fishermen’s behavior in response to four management policy options: external regulations with individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and with individual quotas (IQ), and co-management with ITQs and with IQ. The analysis examined fishermen’s responses under high and low fish stocks that arose due to seasonal salinity in the Lake. Higher fish stocks encouraged fishermen to increase their extraction. A co-management policy led to better results than imposed external regulation in terms of reducing extraction and ensuring resource sustainability. There were no significant differences between ‘with ITQ’ and ‘without ITQ’ in terms of reduction of extraction and sustainability of resource use. However, there were significantly less violation behaviors when ITQs were used rather than with IQ. The ITQs provided more flexibility for fishermen who wanted to increase their extraction while still following conservation guidelines. Therefore, implementation of ITQ is recommended but with appropriate penalties.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.eepsea.net/pub/rr/2013-RR2_Kunlayanee.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2013
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) in its series EEPSEA Research Report with number rr2013021.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Feb 2013
    Date of revision: Feb 2013
    Handle: RePEc:eep:report:rr2013021

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: c/o IDRC, 22 Cross Street, #02-55, South Bridge Court, Singapore 048421
    Phone: 6438 4844
    Fax: 65 6438 7877
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.eepsea.net
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: game theory; Thailand;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Nielsen, Jesper Raakjær & Degnbol, Poul & Viswanathan, K. Kuperan & Ahmed, Mahfuzuddin & Hara, Mafaniso & Abdullah, Nik Mustapha Raja, 2004. "Fisheries co-management--an institutional innovation? Lessons from South East Asia and Southern Africa," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 151-160, March.
    2. Juan-Camilo Cardenas & Elinor Ostrom, 2004. "What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons," Artefactual Field Experiments 00027, The Field Experiments Website.
    3. Juan-Camilo Cardenas, 2004. "Norms from outside and from inside: An experimental analysis on the governance of local ecosystems," Artefactual Field Experiments 00025, The Field Experiments Website.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, 2003. "Real wealth and experimental cooperation: experiments in the field lab," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 263-289, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eep:report:rr2013021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Arief Anshory yusuf).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.