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From the lab to the field: Cooperation among fishermen

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  • Stoop, Jan
  • Noussair, Charles
  • van Soest, Daan

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment to measure cooperation among groups of recreational fishermen at a privately owned fishing facility. The parameters are chosen so that group earnings are greater when group members catch fewer fish, as in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). In a manner consistent with classical economic theory, though in contrast to prior results from laboratory experiments, we find no evidence of cooperation. We construct a series of additional treatments to identify causes of the di®erence. We rule out the subject pool and the laboratory setting as potential causes, and identify the type of activity involved as the source of the lack of cooperation in our field experiment. When cooperation requires a reduction in fishing effort, individuals are not cooperative, whether the reduction in fishing translates into more money or into more fishing opportunities for the group.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28924.

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Date of creation: 16 Sep 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28924

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Keywords: Public Goods Game; Field Experiment; Social Preferences;

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Cited by:
  1. Abeler, Johannes & Becker, Anke & Falk, Armin, 2014. "Representative evidence on lying costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 96-104.
  2. Proto, Eugenio, 2013. "Cooperation and Personality," CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) 143, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  3. Noussair, Charles & van Soest, Daan & Stoop, Jan, 2011. "Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment," MPRA Paper 34067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Ozbay, 2014. "Effect of an audience in public goods provision," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 200-214, June.
  5. J Abeler & A Becker & A Falk, 2012. "Truth-telling - A Representative Assessment," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2012-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  6. Arno Riedl & Paul Smeets, 2013. "Social Preferences and Portfolio Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series 4403, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. D Nosenzo & Jon Anderson & Stephen V Burks & Jeffrey Carpenter & Lorenz Gotte & Karsten Maurer & Ruth Potter & Kim Rocha & Aldo Rustichini, 2012. "Self-Selection and Variations in the Laboratory Measurment of Other-Regarding Preferences Across Subject Pools: Evidence from One College Student and Two Adult Samples," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2012-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  8. Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo, 2013. "Self-selection into Economics Experiments is Driven by Monetary Rewards," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2013-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  9. Yann Girard & Florian Hett, 2013. "Competitiveness in dynamic group contests: Evidence from combined field and lab data," Working Papers, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz 1303, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Apr 2013.

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