Inequality, Communication and the Avoidance of Disastrous Climate Change
AbstractInternational efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally among a group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contributions, knowing that if they fail they will lose all their remaining money with 50% probability. We find that inequality reduces the prospects of reaching the target, but that communication increases success dramatically. Successful groups tend to eliminate inequality over the course of the game, with rich players signalling willingness to redistribute early on. Our results suggest that coordinative institutions and early redistribution from richer to poorer nations may widen our window of opportunity to avoid global climate calamity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Climate Economics & Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University in its series CCEP Working Papers with number 1103.
Date of creation: Mar 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- Alessandro Tavoni & Astrid Dannenberg & Giorgos Kallis & Andreas Löschel, 2011. "Inequality, communication and the avoidance of disastrous climate change," Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Papers 34, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
- Alessandro Tavoni & Astrid Dannenberg & Giorgos Kallis & Andreas Löschel, 2011. "Inequality, communication and the avoidance of disastrous climate change," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37570, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2011-04-02 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-04-02 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-04-02 (Experimental Economics)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- CCEP Paper Published in PNAS
by David Stern in Stochastic Trend on 2011-07-08 00:01:00
- Two New CCEP Papers
by David Stern in Stochastic Trend on 2011-03-27 11:50:00
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XREAP2013-03, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Apr 2013.
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