We analyze local content requirement (LCR) and tariff in a two-country model of vertical market-structure with endogenous foreign direct investment (FDI). The foreign firm chooses whether to export or to undertake FDI. The host country anticipates the potential for FDI and selects tariff with or without LCR rate accordingly. Without LCR, the FDI imposes a threat on the host country and the threat exerts a tariff-liberalizing pressure. This FDI is often coined as quid-pro-quo FDI in the literature. In contrast, we show that with LCR the host government can defuse the threat of quid-pro-quo FDI
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Country and Industry Studies of Trade L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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