Liquidity requirements and payment delays - participant type dependent preferences
AbstractThe paper presents an analysis of the trade-offs of participants of different type between payment delay and liquidity requirement on the basis of synthetically generated data. The generation of the synthetic transaction data set for a simple RTGS system is described and calibrated using real world parameters. The payment system is simulated for various liquidity levels and it is shown that participants of different size in terms of transaction volume and value will have different optimal liquidity requirements, as the payment delays they face for each liquidity level will be different. This is shown using indifference curves between payment delay and liquidity requirements. JEL Classification: C15, C5, E58, L14, L41, L51
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 1291.
Date of creation: Feb 2011
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
- C5 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-CMP-2011-02-19 (Computational Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kimmo Soramaki & Morten L. Bech & Jeffrey Arnold & Robert J. Glass & Walter Beyeler, 2006.
"The topology of interbank payment flows,"
243, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Soramäki, Kimmo & Bech, Morten L. & Arnold, Jeffrey & Glass, Robert J. & Beyeler, Walter E., 2007. "The topology of interbank payment flows," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 379(1), pages 317-333.
- Soramäki, Kimmo & Cook, Samantha, 2012. "Algorithm for identifying systemically important banks in payment systems," Economics Discussion Papers 2012-43, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Soramäki, Kimmo & Cook, Samantha, 2013. "SinkRank: An algorithm for identifying systemically important banks in payment systems," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 7(28), pages 1-27.
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