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Las entidades de contrapartida central en la mitigación del riesgo de contraparte y de liquidez: El caso de los derivados cambiarios en Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • Ricardo Mariño-Martínez

    (Banco de la República de Colombia)

  • Carlos León

    (Banco de la República de Colombia)

  • Carlos Cadena-Silva

    (Banco de la República de Colombia)

Abstract

Las entidades de contrapartida central (ECC) se interponen entre compradores y vendedores para eliminar sus obligaciones bilaterales y así mitigar el riesgo de contraparte. Es de esperar que esta interposición afecte la manera en que interactúan los participantes en los mercados financieros. Con base en datos transaccionales de las operaciones de intercambio a plazo peso-dólar sin entrega (COP/USD FX-non-delivery forwards) y en el análisis de redes, este artículo compara las transacciones cuando se acuerda la compensación y liquidación por intermedio de la Cámara de Riesgo Central de Contraparte de Colombia (CRCC) con aquellas en las que se acuerda la compensación y liquidación bilateral –sin la CRCC. El efecto de la interposición de la CRCC es el esperado. La red de transacciones en las que se acuerda la interposición de la CRCC muestra un aumento significativo en la conectividad (i.e. mayor densidad, reciprocidad y agrupamiento), y una disminución significativa en la distancia entre participantes. Esto sugiere que acordar la interposición de la CRCC permite mitigar el riesgo de liquidez. Con la interposición, la red de exposiciones resultante presenta una menor conectividad y mayor distancia, lo cual es consistente con la mitigación del riesgo de contraparte. Las diferencias en la estructura de las redes son significativas. Los resultados son relevantes porque permiten visualizar y cuantificar el efecto que tiene la CRCC en la administración del riesgo.**** ABSTRACT: A central counterparty (CCP) interposes itself between buyers and sellers of financial contracts to extinguish their bilateral exposures and –thus- to reduce counterparty risk. Therefore, this interposition should affect the way market participants engage in financial markets. Based on transactional data corresponding to the Colombian Peso non-delivery forward market and network analysis basics, this article compares transactions agreed to be cleared and settled by Cámara de Riesgo Central de Contraparte de Colombia (CRCC, the sole CCP in Colombia) with those to be cleared and settled bilaterally. The effect corresponds to what is expected. Networks of transactions to be cleared and settled by CRCC show significantly higher connectivity (i.e. higher density, reciprocity and transitivity), along with a lower distance among participating financial institutions. This suggests that agreeing on clearing and settlement by CRCC reduces liquidity risk. With the interposition of CRCC the resulting exposures networks show lower connectivity and higher distances, which concurs with counterparty risk mitigation. Differences in the structure of networks are significant. Results are important as they enable to visualize and quantify the effect of clearing and settlement by CRCC in risk management.

Suggested Citation

  • Ricardo Mariño-Martínez & Carlos León & Carlos Cadena-Silva, 2020. "Las entidades de contrapartida central en la mitigación del riesgo de contraparte y de liquidez: El caso de los derivados cambiarios en Colombia," Borradores de Economia 1101, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:1101
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.32468/be.1101
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Riesgo de contraparte; riesgo de liquidez; redes; compensación central;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System

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