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Analysis, by simulation, of the impact of a technical default of a payment system participant

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  • Mazars, E.
  • Woelfel, G.

Abstract

Payment systems play a very important role in ensuring the safe and efficient transfer of deposits and financial instruments. Consequently, the failure of these systems may have a destabilising impact. Business continuity plans have thus been developed to ensure their robustness. However, their smooth functioning is also contingent on the capacity of participants to submit their payment orders. The Banque de France, in its role of overseer of the French payment systems, conducted a study with a view to enhancing its understanding of the consequences and the impact of the technical default of a participant in such systems. This study, carried out using a simulator of the functioning of the Paris Net Settlement (PNS) large-value payment system, operated by the CRI (Centrale des Règlements Interbancaires), shows that the technical default of a participant in this system has negative consequences on the smooth running of the system. Indeed, a situation in which a major participant, in the wake of a technical incident, is unable to submit its payment orders in a normal fashion to its counterparties in PNS, could further exacerbate congestion in the system and result in almost 10% of payments being rejected among non-defaulting participants. The consequences of a technical default could nevertheless be greatly reduced if the participants set their bilateral sender limits at a lower level than that currently observed and if they reacted rapidly to information indicating a technical default by reducing their bilateral limits with the defaulting participant (defaulter).

Suggested Citation

  • Mazars, E. & Woelfel, G., 2005. "Analysis, by simulation, of the impact of a technical default of a payment system participant," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 6, pages 113-124, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bfr:fisrev:2005:6:5
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    Cited by:

    1. Elisabeth Ledrut, 2007. "Simulating retaliation in payment systems: Can banks control their exposure to a failing participant?," DNB Working Papers 133, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    2. Schulz, Christian, 2011. "Liquidity requirements and payment delays - participant type dependent preferences," Working Paper Series 1291, European Central Bank.

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