Managerial appraisal and compensation: The case of Spain
AbstractThis paper explores some fundamental tasks associated with corporate governance: manager appraisal and compensation. Most of the empirical research in this area has been centered on Anglo-Saxon countries. Some European countries, such as Spain, have a very different governance tradition. Given this context, the work presented here has two objectives: 1.- To describe existing appraisal and compensation practices in Spain, comparing them with those used in the USA. 2.- To study the determinants of CEO compensation, and the relationship between CEO compensation and certain Board practices, using agency theory
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IESE Business School in its series IESE Research Papers with number D/413.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 24 Mar 2000
Date of revision:
Appraisal; compensation; agency;
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