Optimal Tariff Calculations in Tariff Games with Climate Change Considerations
AbstractWe discuss whether or not the introduction of climate change considerations into Nash tariff games increases or reduces post retaliation tariffs. We briefly discuss how climate change considerations can be introduced into computational trade models. We then calculate optimal tariffs in comparable conventional (no climate change considerations present) and with climate change trade models. Results show that compared to conventional trade models, adding climate change considerations reduces the level of optimal tariffs, but this only occurs when the damage effects involved are large.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Trade Working Papers with number 23039.
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
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Climate change; Nash tariff games; climate change trade models; trade models;
Other versions of this item:
- Yan Dong & John Whalley, 2011. "Optimal tariff calculations in tariff games with climate change considerations," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(15), pages 1431-1435.
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
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