Ã¢â‚¬Å“Incentives from Exchange Rate Regimes in an Institutional Context"
AbstractIn a simple open EME macromodel, calibrated to the typical institutions and shocks of a densely populated emerging market economy, a monetary stimulus preceding a temporary supply shock can lower interest rates, raise output, appreciate exchange rates, and lower inflation. Simulations generalize the analytic result with regressions validating the parameter values. Under correct incentives, such as provided by a middling exchange rate regime, which imparts limited volatility to the nominal exchange rate around a trend competitive rate, forex traders support the policy. The policy is compatible with political constraints and policy objectives, but analysis of strategic interactions brings out cases where optimal policy will not be chosen. Supporting institutions are required to coordinate monetary, fiscal policy and markets to the optimal equilibrium. The analysis contributes to understanding the key issues for countries such as India and China that need to deepen markets in order to move to more flexible exchange rate regimes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Macroeconomics Working Papers with number 22370.
Date of creation: Jan 2005
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exchange rate; hedging; supply shocks; EMEs; incentives; politics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
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