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• Ajit Mishra

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Paper provided by University of Dundee, Economic Studies in its series Discussion Papers with number 184.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:dun:dpaper:184

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Keywords: Banking; Financial Stability; Bank Fragility; Options; Estonia;

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1. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-59, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Ashok S. Rai & Tomas Sjostrom, . "Is Grameen Lending Efficient?," CID Working Papers 40, Center for International Development at Harvard University. [Downloadable!]
3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 6945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Mitchell Polinsky, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1127, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2000. "Harassment, corruption and tax policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 75-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
6. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jean Hindriks, Michael Keen and Abhinay Muthoo, . "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Economics Discussion Papers 470, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
   • Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1996. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Papers 179, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
   • Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1998. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion," Discussion Papers 98/09, University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics.
7. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-23, October.
8. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
   Other versions:
   • Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information," Papers 95.389, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
9. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-66, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-56, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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