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Médecins généralistes à faibles revenus : une préférence pour le loisir ?

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Author Info
Anne-Laure Samson

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Abstract

This article looks at a remarkable point in the GPs'population : the existence of a large minority of low income physicians. 5 to 7 % of GPs earn less that 1.5 net SMIC (French minimum wage). These GPs are more frequently women or physicians practicing in areas where the medical density is very high but also where the quality of life is better. Using an econometric analysis, we measure their reaction to a demand shock. We find that these GPs never react to a positive demand shock and only react to a negative one : their activity decreases when they are constrained to. We show that their low income results from a greater preference for leisure. Their very low level of activity reflects an advantage of the profession of self-employed physician : GPs may choose to work less.

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File URL: http://economix.u-paris10.fr/pdf/dt/2009/WP_EcoX_2009-01.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX in its series EconomiX Working Papers with number 2009-1.

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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2009-1

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Related research
Keywords: GPs; self-employed; low-income physicians; target income; work-leisure trade-off; longitudinal data;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bolduc, Denis & Fortin, Bernard & Fournier, Marc-Andre, 1996. "The Effect of Incentive Policies on the Practice Location of Doctors: A Multinomial Probit Analysis," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 703-32, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Brigitte Dormont & Anne-Laure Samson, 2008. "Medical Demography and Intergenerational inequalities in GPs' earnings," Post-Print halshs-00351781_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-17.


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