IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/dpr/wpaper/0668.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent

Author

Listed:
  • Koji Takamiya

Abstract

It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some known results.

Suggested Citation

  • Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent," ISER Discussion Paper 0668, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0668
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2006/DP0668.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    2. Takamiya, Koji, 2001. "Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 201-213, March.
    3. Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 677-690, May.
    4. Ishikawa, Shin & Nakamura, Kenjiro, 1979. "The strategy-proof social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 283-295, December.
    5. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
    6. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    7. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    8. Koji Takamiya, 2003. "On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(1), pages 77-83.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Takamiya, Koji, 2007. "Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 348-354, June.
    2. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2009. "The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 256-264, September.
    3. Takamiya, Koji, 2001. "Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 201-213, March.
    4. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011. "Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.
    5. Joseph Root & David S. Ahn, 2020. "Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms," Papers 2006.06776, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    6. Raghavan, Madhav, 2020. "Influence in private-goods allocation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 14-28.
    7. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    8. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.
    9. Pycia, Marek & Unver, Utku, 2017. "Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    10. Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2013. "The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 41-63, January.
    11. Chen, Yajing & Zhao, Fang, 2021. "Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    12. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2005. "Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-33, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    13. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488.
    14. Yajing Chen & Zhenhua Jiao & Chenfeng Zhang & Luosai Zhang, 2021. "The Machiavellian frontier of top trading cycles," Papers 2106.14456, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    15. Di Feng & Bettina Klaus, 2022. "Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 61-76, March.
    16. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.
    17. Karakaya, Mehmet & Klaus, Bettina & Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2019. "Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    18. Takamiya, Koji, 2009. "Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 199-204, January.
    19. Hikaru Kondo, 2019. "Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 23(3), pages 113-126, December.
    20. Ehlers, Lars, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 393-407.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0668. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Librarian (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/isosujp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.