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On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result

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  • Koji Takamiya

    () (Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University, Kita9 Nishi7 Sapporo 060-0809 Japan)

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    Abstract

    In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established that, whenever the core is nonempty for each preference profile, if an allocation rule is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal, then the rule is a selection from the core correspondence, and the core correspondence must be essentially single-valued. This paper studies the converse claim of this result. I demonstrate that whenever the preference domain satisfies a certain condition of `richness', if the core correspondence is essentially single-valued, then any selection from the core correspondence is strategy-proof (even weakly coalition strategy-proof, in fact). In particular, on the domain of preferences in which each individual has strict preferences over his own assignments and there is no consumption externality, such an allocation rule is coalition strategy-proof. And on this domain, coalition strategy-proofness is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, an important property in implementation theory.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

    Volume (Year): 20 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 77-83

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:1:p:77-83

    Note: Received: 22 February 2000/Accepted: 22 January 2002
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    Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm

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    Cited by:
    1. Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez, 2005. "Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation," Economics Working Papers we055525, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
    2. Takamiya, Koji, 2007. "Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 348-354, June.
    3. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent," ISER Discussion Paper 0668, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:10:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Takamiya, Koji, 2009. "Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 199-204, January.
    6. Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2010. "The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 10.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
    7. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2009. "The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 256-264, September.
    8. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities," ISER Discussion Paper 0651, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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