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Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

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Author Info
Philipp J. H. Schröder

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Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other's markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, thus integration is pro-competitive. If integration consists of a reductions in unit (fixed) trade costs a price setting cartel is strengthened (unaffected), while a quantity setting one is weakened.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 432.

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Length: 23 p.
Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp432

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Related research
Keywords: Collusive behavior Trade liberalisation Specific tariffs Market access cost

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Smith, Alasdair & Venables, Anthony J., 1988. "Completing the Internal Market in the European Community: Some Industry Simulations," CEPR Discussion Papers 233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Andrew K. Rose, 2000. "One money, one market: the effect of common currencies on trade," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 15(30), pages 7-46, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Davidson, Carl, 1984. "Cartel stability and tariff policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3-4), pages 219-237, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lommerund, K.E. & Sorgard, L., 1998. "Trade Liberalization and Cartel Stability," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0198, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
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  5. McCallum, John, 1995. "National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 615-23, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1989. "Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 237-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Constantinos Syropoulos & Eric Bond, 2003. "Is the Tariff the ‘Mother of Trusts’? Reciprocal Trade Liberalization with Multimarket Collusion," Working Papers 0310, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Chris Allen & Michael Gasiorek & Alasdair Smith, 1998. "The competition effects of the Single Market in Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 13(27), pages 439-486, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Fung, K C, 1992. "Economic Integration as Competitive Discipline," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(4), pages 837-47, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Baier, Scott L. & Bergstrand, Jeffrey H., 2001. "The growth of world trade: tariffs, transport costs, and income similarity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-27, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Schröder, Philipp J.H. & Jørgensen, Jan G., 2001. "Reductions in Real versus Tariff Barriers: The Effects on Industry Concentration," MPRA Paper 124, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-10-6.

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