The Influence of Collusion on Price Changes: New Evidence from Major Cartel Cases
AbstractIn this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and noncollusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 1004.
Length: 17 p.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Cartel detection; collusion; competition policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Korbinian Blanckenburg & Alexander Geist & Konstantin A. Kholodilin, 2012. "The Influence of Collusion on Price Changes: New Evidence from Major Cartel Cases," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 13(3), pages 245-256, 08.
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L60 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2010-05-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HIS-2010-05-29 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-IND-2010-05-29 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2010-05-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2010-05-29 (Regulation)
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- Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets," Discussion Papers in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 16179, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Korbinian von Blanckenburg & Marc Hanfeld & Konstantin A. Kholodilin, 2013. "A Market Screening Model for Price Inconstancies: Empirical Evidence from German Electricity Markets," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1274, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Preißler-Jebe, Jan Hendrik & von Blanckenburg, Korbinian & Geist, Alexander, 2010.
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CAWM Discussion Papers, Center of Applied Economic Research MÃ¼nster (CAWM), University of MÃ¼nster
41, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM), University of Münster.
- Jan Hendrik Preißler-Jebe, Korbinian von Blanckenburg, Alexander Geist, . "Comparing Cartel Behavior: A Simulation Analysis with the System of Cartel Markers (SCM)," Working Papers, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary 201041, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary.
- Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Endogenous Price Commitment, Sticky and Leadership Pricing: Evidence from the Italian Petrol Market," Discussion Papers in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 16182, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Andrei Y. Shastitko & Svetlana V. Golovanova, 2014. "Collusion in markets characterized by one large buyer: lessons learned from an antitrust case in Russia," HSE Working papers, National Research University Higher School of Economics WP BRP 49/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
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