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L’influence des Capital Investisseurs sur la gestion des ressources humaines des entreprises financées:dimensions, enjeux et limites

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  • Anne Stévenot-Guéry

    ()
    (Université de Nancy 2)

  • Loris Guéry

    ()
    (Université de Bourgogne)

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    Abstract

    (VF)Dans la mesure où elle peut avoir une incidence sur la création de valeur, les capital investisseurs (CI) sont susceptibles d’intervenir dans la gestion des ressources humaines (GRH) des entreprises qu’ils financent. La littérature montre une implication des CI au niveau de la stratégie et de la gestion financière, mais peu d’études se sont intéressées spécifiquement à leur influence sur la GRH. Cette recherche vise par conséquent à mieux comprendre quelles sont les dimensions de la GRH influencées par les CI, comment s’opère cette influence (logiques disciplinaires et cognitives) et quelles sont les réactions des dirigeants des entreprises concernées (réactance psychologique et enracinement). La partie empirique consiste en une étude longitudinale de onze cas d’entreprises financées par CI. Des entretiens semi-directifs ont été menés auprès des représentants de quatre sociétés de CI et des onze dirigeants d’entreprises appartenant à leurs portefeuilles de participation.(VA)As Human Resource Management (HRM) can influence value creation, Venture Capitalists (VCs) are supposed to be involved in HRM of their financed firms. Literature shows that VCs have some influence on strategy and finance, but few studies deal with their impact on HRM. This research analyzes the aspects and the way (disciplinary and cognitive way) of VCs’ influence on HRM, and the CEO’s reactions (psychological reactance and entrenchment). Empirical data has been collected through a longitudinal qualitative study of eleven cases of firms financed by VCs. Interviews have been conducted with four VCs and eleven CEOs of their portfolio.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1060502.

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    Length: 35 pages
    Date of creation: May 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1060502

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    Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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    Keywords: capital investisseurs; gestion des ressources humaines; gouvernance; enracinement; réactance psychologique; étude de cas; venture capitalists; human resource management; governance; entrenchment; psychological reactance; case study.;

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    1. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1997. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Working Papers CREGO 0970801, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
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    11. Philippe Desbrières & Alain Schatt, 2002. "L'incidence des LBO sur la politique d'investissement et la gestion opérationnelle des firmes acquises:le cas français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(4), pages 79-106, December.
    12. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2001. "Venture Capitalists As Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring," NBER Working Papers 8202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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