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L’influence des Capital Investisseurs sur la gestion des ressources humaines des entreprises financées:dimensions, enjeux et limites

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Author Info
Anne Stévenot-Guéry () (Université de Nancy 2)
Loris Guéry () (Université de Bourgogne)
Abstract

(VF)Dans la mesure où elle peut avoir une incidence sur la création de valeur, les capital investisseurs (CI) sont susceptibles d’intervenir dans la gestion des ressources humaines (GRH) des entreprises qu’ils financent. La littérature montre une implication des CI au niveau de la stratégie et de la gestion financière, mais peu d’études se sont intéressées spécifiquement à leur influence sur la GRH. Cette recherche vise par conséquent à mieux comprendre quelles sont les dimensions de la GRH influencées par les CI, comment s’opère cette influence (logiques disciplinaires et cognitives) et quelles sont les réactions des dirigeants des entreprises concernées (réactance psychologique et enracinement). La partie empirique consiste en une étude longitudinale de onze cas d’entreprises financées par CI. Des entretiens semi-directifs ont été menés auprès des représentants de quatre sociétés de CI et des onze dirigeants d’entreprises appartenant à leurs portefeuilles de participation.(VA)As Human Resource Management (HRM) can influence value creation, Venture Capitalists (VCs) are supposed to be involved in HRM of their financed firms. Literature shows that VCs have some influence on strategy and finance, but few studies deal with their impact on HRM. This research analyzes the aspects and the way (disciplinary and cognitive way) of VCs’ influence on HRM, and the CEO’s reactions (psychological reactance and entrenchment). Empirical data has been collected through a longitudinal qualitative study of eleven cases of firms financed by VCs. Interviews have been conducted with four VCs and eleven CEOs of their portfolio.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1060502.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1060502

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Postal: Gérard Charreaux, Fargo-Latec, Université de Bourgogne 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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Related research
Keywords: capital investisseurs; gestion des ressources humaines; gouvernance; enracinement; réactance psychologique; étude de cas; venture capitalists; human resource management; governance; entrenchment; psychological reactance; case study.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executive Compensation

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  3. Ruback, Richard S & Zimmerman, Martin B, 1984. "Unionization and Profitability: Evidence from the Capital Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 1134-57, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Castanias, Richard P. & Helfat, Constance E., 1992. "Managerial and windfall rents in the market for corporate control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 153-184, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory," Papers 88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
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  8. Gorman, Michael & Sahlman, William A., 1989. "What do venture capitalists do?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 231-248, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Philippe Desbrières & Alain Schatt, 2002. "L'incidence des LBO sur la politique d'investissement et la gestion opérationnelle des firmes acquises:le cas français," Working Papers FARGO 1021001, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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