Does Crime Pay? A Classroom Demonstration of Monitoring and Enforcement
AbstractThis paper presents a classroom game in which students choose whether or not to comply with pollution regulations. By changing the level of monitoring and fines for noncompliance across periods, the game shows students how the probability and severity of enforcement affects incentives for compliance. The game can be adapted for settings other than environmental regulation and can be used in a variety of classes including regulation, law and economics, environmental economics, public economics, or the economics of crime. It can easily be conducted in a fifty-minute class period.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 17.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 12 May 2005
Date of revision:
Classroom Experiment; Non-Compliance; Pollution;
Other versions of this item:
- Lisa R. Anderson & Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Does Crime Pay? A Classroom Demonstration of Monitoring and Enforcement," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 1016â1025, April.
- A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-07-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2005-07-03 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-07-03 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
- Anderson, Lisa R & Stafford, Sarah L, 2003. "Punishment in a Regulatory Setting: Experimental Evidence from the VCM," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 91-110, July.
- Block, Michael K & Gerety, Vernon E, 1995. "Some Experimental Evidence on Differences between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 123-38, January.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:att:wimass:9610 is not listed on IDEAS
- Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996.
9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Mitchell, David & Rebelein, Robert P. & Schneider, Patricia & Simpson, Nicole B. & Eric Fisher, .
"A Classroom Experiment on Exchange Rate Determination with Purchasing Power Parity,"
Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series
87, Vassar College Department of Economics.
- David T. Mitchell & Robert P. Rebelein & Patricia H. Schneider & Nicole B. Simpson & Eric Fisher, 2009. "A Classroom Experiment on Exchange Rate Determination with Purchasing Power Parity," Journal of Economic Education, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 40(2), pages 150-165, April.
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