To analyze the effectiveness of punishment in inducing regulatory compliance, we modify a standard public goods experiment to include a financial penalty for free riding. The design allows us to vary both punishment probability and severity. We introduce the punishment mechanism in both a one-time and a repeated treatment and find that compliance (contributing to the public good) is increasing in expected punishment cost in both treatments. We also find that punishment severity has a larger effect on behavior than punishment probability. In the repeated treatment, we find that past punishment has a negative rather than positive effect on compliance. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)