Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Health Reform, Health Insurance, and Selection: Estimating Selection into Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our test examines changes in the cost of the newly insured relative to those who were insured prior to the reform. We find that counties with larger increases in insurance coverage over the reform period face the smallest increase in average hospital costs for the insured population, consistent with adverse selection into insurance before the reform. Additional results, incorporating cross-state variation and data on health measures, provide further evidence for adverse selection.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d18a/d1841.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1841.

as in new window
Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings (May 2012), 102(3): 498-501
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1841

Note: CFP 1361
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

Related research

Keywords: Adverse selection; Massachusetts; Health reform;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jonathan T. Kolstad & Amanda E. Kowalski, 2010. "The Impact of Health Care Reform On Hospital and Preventive Care: Evidence from Massachusetts," NBER Working Papers 16012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. David M. Cutler & Sarah Reber, 1996. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Tradeoff between Competition and Adverse Selection," NBER Working Papers 5796, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. מחקר - ביטוח לאומי, 2006. "Annual Survey 2005," Working Papers 15, National Insurance Institute of Israel.
  4. Jonathan Gruber, 2011. "Massachusetts points the way to successful health care reform," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 184-192, December.
  5. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Mark R. Cullen, 2010. "Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(3), pages 877-921, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Briggs Depew & James Bailey, . "Did the Affordable Care Act's Dependent Coverage Mandate Increase Premiums?," Departmental Working Papers 2014-07, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
  2. Jonathan T. Kolstad & Amanda E. Kowalski, 2012. "Mandate-Based Health Reform and the Labor Market: Evidence from the Massachusetts Reform," NBER Working Papers 17933, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Naoki Aizawa & Hanming Fang, 2013. "Equilibrium Labor Market Search and Health Insurance Reform," NBER Working Papers 18698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Martin B. Hackmann & Jonathan T. Kolstad & Amanda E. Kowalski, 2013. "Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate: When Theory Meets Practice," NBER Working Papers 19149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Naoki Aizawa & Hanming Fang, 2013. "Equilibrium Labor Market Search and Health Insurance Reform," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  6. Andrew Beauchamp & Mathis Wagner, 2012. "Dying to Retire: Adverse Selection and Welfare in Social Security," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 818, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 15 Aug 2013.
  7. Craig Garthwaite & Tal Gross & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, 2013. "Public Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Employment Lock," NBER Working Papers 19220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
  1. Health Reform, Health Insurance, and Selection: Estimating Selection into Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform (AER 2012) in ReplicationWiki

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1841. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Glena Ames).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.