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Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

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Abstract

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents or buyers whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents or buyers whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d17b/d1757.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1757.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in J.J. Cochran, L.A. Cox, P. Keskinocak, J.P. Kharoufeh, and J.C. Smith, eds. Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 2, Wiley, 2011, pp. 1511-1522
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1757

Note: CFP 1325
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

Related research

Keywords: Dynamic auctions and mechanisms; Random arrivals and departures; Changing private information; Incentive compatibility;

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References

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  1. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu, 2009. "Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1576-87, September.
  2. M. Ali Khan, 2007. "Perfect Competition," PIDE-Working Papers 2007:15, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
  3. Mark Satterthwaite & Artyom Shneyerov, 2007. "Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 155-200, 01.
  4. Dirk & Juuso Valimaki, 1998. "Dynamic Common Agency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1206, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 637-658, June.
  6. Péter Eső & Bal�zs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
  7. Thomas Kittsteiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 236-248, February.
  8. Courty, Pascal & Li, Hao, 2000. "Sequential Screening," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 697-717, October.
  9. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu, 2009. "Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 168-98, August.
  10. Doepke, Matthias & Townsend, Robert M., 2006. "Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 235-285, January.
  11. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2010. "Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 144-154, January.
  15. Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Yossi Aviv & Amit Pazgal, 2008. "Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 10(3), pages 339-359, December.
  17. Simon Board, 2008. "Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 391-413.
  18. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
  19. S. Christian Albright, 1974. "Optimal Sequential Assignments with Random Arrival Times," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 60-67, September.
  20. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Katehakis, Michael N. & Puranam, Kartikeya S., 2012. "On bidding for a fixed number of items in a sequence of auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 76-84.
  2. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

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