Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges
AbstractWe investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of combinatorial auctions and bilateral trades, where the multiple commodities to be traded are possessed by participants and a central planner as endowments. Private values, risk neutrality, and independent types are assumed. Efficiency, Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, and Interim Individual Rationality are required. We characterize the least upper bound of the central plannerfs expected revenue. We introduce a stability notion, namely, the marginal core, to the assumption that the central plannerfs endowment is unprotected. We show that the central planner has a deficit in expectation if and only if the marginal core is non-empty.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo in its series CARF F-Series with number CARF-F-258.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2011
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