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Nonexclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Agar Brugiavini
Gwenaël Piaser () (CREFI-LSF, University of Luxembourg)
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Using a common agency framework, we characterize possible equilibria when annuities contracts are not exclusive. We discuss theoretical and empirical implications of these equilibria. First, we show that at equilibrium prices are not linear. Then we characterize an equilibrium. We provide conditions for existence and show that this equilibrium is efficient.
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Paper provided by CREFI-LSF, University of Luxembourg in its series Working Papers of CREFI-LSF (Centre of Research in Finance - Luxembourg School of Finance) with number
06-03.
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Date of creation: 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:crf:wpaper:06-03Contact details of provider: Web page: http://fdef.uni.lu/index.php/fdef/lux_school_of_finance/crefi_lsf More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Caroline Herfroy).
Keywords: Menus ; Common Agency ; Insurance ; Annuity Markets ; Adverse Selection ; Efficiency. ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
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Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2006.
"Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market ,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics ,
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Econometrica ,
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