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Non-exclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market

Author

Listed:
  • Agar Brugiavini

    (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca� Foscari)

  • Gwena�l Piaser

    (Department of Economics, University of Venice Ca� Foscari)

Abstract

Using a common agency framework, we characterize possible equilibria when annuities contracts are not exclusive. We discuss theoretical and empirical implications of these equilibria. First, we show that at equilibrium prices are not linear. Then we characterize an equilibrium. We provide conditions for existence and show that this equilibrium is efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Agar Brugiavini & Gwena�l Piaser, 2006. "Non-exclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market," Working Papers 2006_39, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    • Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_39
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 306-328, Summer.
    2. Attar Andrea & Campioni Eloisa & Piaser Gwenael, 2006. "Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-37, October.
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    4. Menahem E. Yaari, 1965. "Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 32(2), pages 137-150.
    5. Pierre André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work," CESifo Working Paper Series 738, CESifo.
    6. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2002. "Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 28-50, January.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Menus; Common Agency; Insurance; Annuity Markets; Adverse Selection; Efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets

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