Awards As Signals
Abstract
Awards are widespread in all countries and are prevalent both in the public sphere and in the private sector. This paper argues, and empirically supports, that awards serve public functions and economists should take them seriously. Using a unique cross-country data set, we suggest that awards serve as signals. Awards are more prevalent the more difficult the position and status of an individual is to observe due to an anonymous and globalized setting.Download Info
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Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2010-21.Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2010-21
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Related research
Keywords: Awards; Signals; Status; Anonymity; Globalization;Other versions of this item:
- Bruno S. Frey & Susanne Neckermann, 2010. "Awards as signals," IEW - Working Papers 513, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Susanne Neckermann, 2010. "Awards as Signals," CESifo Working Paper Series 3229, CESifo Group Munich.
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
References
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