The Neglected Effects of Demand Characteristics on the Sustainability of Collusion
AbstractAccording to standard IO models, the characteristics of market demand (intercept, slope, elasticity) and of the technology (level of symmetric marginal costs) do not play any role in defining the sustainability of collusive behaviors in Bertrand oligopolies. The paper modifies this counterintuitive result by showing that all the above mentioned factors do affect the sustainability of collusion when prices are assumed to be discrete rather than continuous. The sign of these effects is unambiguous. Their magnitude varies greatly: in some cases it is totally negligible, in others it becomes extremely relevant.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6975.
Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Other versions of this item:
- Gallice, Andrea, 2010. "The neglected effects of demand characteristics on the sustainability of collusion," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(4), pages 240-246, December.
- Andrea Gallice, 2008. "The Neglected Effects of Demand Characteristics on the Sustainability of Collusion," ICER Working Papers 03-2008, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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