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Ex Ante Effects of Ex Post Managerial Ownership

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  • Cornelli, Francesca
  • Li, David

Abstract

This paper highlights the trade-off between the need to restructure a company and the need to provide managers with appropriate incentives to run it after the restructuring. In order to provide incentives, it is optimal to let managers acquire equity in the firm. However, the expectations to be able to buy shares in the future may create ex-ante incentives to delay restructuring. This effect is particularly important for events where managers can acquire a substantial number of shares, such as privatizations or MBOs. In equilibrium, the shares are not underpriced, but the delay in restructuring which took place in the period before reduces the value of the company. We report empirical evidence on MBOs and privatizations consistent with the model in this paper.

Suggested Citation

  • Cornelli, Francesca & Li, David, 2006. "Ex Ante Effects of Ex Post Managerial Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 5821, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5821
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    Cited by:

    1. Saprudin & Tuty Rosyaty & Ahmad Syukron, 2019. "Relationship between Organizational Culture and Locus of Control with Bogor Regency Employee Performance," International Review of Management and Marketing, Econjournals, vol. 9(4), pages 143-148.
    2. Laura Cabeza García & Silvia Gómez Ansón, 2012. "What Drives the Operating Performance of Privatised Firms?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-27, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privatizations; managers incentives; management buy-outs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • P34 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance

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