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Form of Compensation and Managerial Decision Horizon

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  • Narayanan, M. P.

Abstract

This paper investigates the relation between the form of compensation and the manager's decision horizon. It finds that while all-cash contracts induce managers to underinvest in the long term, all-stock contracts induce overinvestment in the long term. It shows that compensation contracts consisting of both cash and restricted stock can produce efficient investment, thereby providing a rationale for the existence of both cash and stock incentive schemes in executive compensation packages. This explains why the adoption of either type of incentive scheme results in a positive stock price reaction. In addition, the paper derives the following testable hypotheses: i) the proportion of the stock compensation is decreasing in the precision of the manager's ability and increasing in the precision of the firm's cash flows; ii) firms compensate their managers with proportionately more stock in profitable years and proportionately more cash in leaner years; and iii) the greater the growth opportunities, the higher the proportion of stock compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Narayanan, M. P., 1996. "Form of Compensation and Managerial Decision Horizon," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 467-491, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:31:y:1996:i:04:p:467-491_02
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas H. Noe & Michael J. Rebello & Thomas A. Rietz, 2012. "Product Market Efficiency: The Bright Side of Myopic, Uninformed, and Passive External Finance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(11), pages 2019-2036, November.
    2. Sunkee Lee & Philipp Meyer-Doyle, 2017. "How Performance Incentives Shape Individual Exploration and Exploitation: Evidence from Microdata," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 19-38, February.
    3. Brusco, Sandro, 1999. "Short-Termism as Optimal Investment Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Andrikopoulos, Andreas, 2015. "Truth and financial economics: A review and assessment," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 186-195.
    5. Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2011. "Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 633-662, October.
    6. Aloke Ghosh & Doocheol Moon & Kishore Tandon, 2007. "CEO Ownership and Discretionary Investments," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(5‐6), pages 819-839, June.
    7. Ghaly, Mohamed & Dang, Viet Anh & Stathopoulos, Konstantinos, 2020. "Institutional investors' horizons and corporate employment decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    8. Brusco, Sandro, 1999. "Short-termism as optimal experimentation policy," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 6522, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
    9. Holden, Craig W. & Lundstrum, Leonard L., 2009. "Costly trade, managerial myopia, and long-term investment," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 126-135, January.
    10. Rihab Guidara & Younes Boujelbene, 2014. "Earnings Management around Research and Development Manipulation," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 4(2), pages 26-37, April.
    11. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Other publications TiSEM aee04553-20a7-475a-96e1-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Ferreira, Daniel & Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Goh, Lisa, 2017. "Changes in CEO Stock Option Grants: A Look at the Numbers," CEPR Discussion Papers 12318, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Cornelli, Francesca & Li, David, 2006. "Ex Ante Effects of Ex Post Managerial Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 5821, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Sharma, Vaibhav & Hsieh, Chialing, 2011. "Managerial horizons in stock financed mergers," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 152-161, May.
    15. Gérard Hirigoyen & Thierry Poulain-Rehm, 2017. "Comparative approach of governance models: an empirical study [Approche comparative des modèles de gouvernance : Une étude empirique]," Post-Print hal-02521878, HAL.
    16. Wahal, Sunil & McConnell, John J., 2000. "Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 307-329, September.
    17. João Paulo Vieito & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão & Walayet A. Khan, 2009. "Executive Compensation: the Finance Perspective," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 0(1), pages 3-32.
    18. repec:hur:ijaraf:v:4:y:2014:i:2:p:30-41 is not listed on IDEAS

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