Individual vs. Parental Consent in Marriage: Implications for Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Growth
AbstractMarrying individuals' consent has been requirement for marriage in Europe since the Middle Ages - in most of the rest of the world parental consent reigned until at least until the 1950s. This paper investigates the role of consent in marriage for intra-household allocation of resources and growth. We argue that a shift from parental to individual consent moves resources in the same direction, favouring young men and young women over old men. If young adults have greater incentives to invest in child human capital than the old (who will be around fewer periods), this may impact on growth. We formulate a simple endogenous growth model capturing these aspects.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5474.
Date of creation: Jan 2006
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2006-01-29 (Development)
- NEP-EDU-2006-01-29 (Education)
- NEP-SOC-2006-01-29 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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