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The Need for Institutional Changes in the Global Financial System: An Analytical Framework

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  • Claessens, Stijn
  • Underhill, Geoffrey R D

Abstract

The international financial system has been the subject of much debate following the financial crises of the 1990s. While many reforms have been proposed for and implemented by mostly developing countries, few changes have been made to the international financial system itself. Fundamentally, the design, institutions, and governance of the international system remain very similar to those of two decades ago. The major changes in global financial markets, financial services industries and economies during this period, however, have rendered the international financial system and its governance of out date. In this paper, we analyse the causes and consequences of the failure to reform. We highlight the forces driving the need for changes in the governance of the international financial system, in particular the combination of the global integration processes and the increased role of the private sector. We then provide insights into the desirable institutional structure for international financial decision-making, also as it relates to the legitimacy of the international system in the eyes of the public worldwide. We also discuss the (political economy) factors inhibiting reform. We conclude with suggestions for future research.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4970.

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Date of creation: Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4970

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Keywords: international financial arrangements; international financial institutions; international governance; legitimacy; political economy;

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  1. Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, 1998. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," NBER Working Papers 6612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Claessens, Stijn & Klingebiel, Daniela & Schmukler, Sergio, 2002. "Explaining the Migration of Stocks from Exchanges in Emerging Economies to International Centres," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3301, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Enrico Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2002. "The Political Economy of Bank- and Market Dominance," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP 02.14, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, revised Apr 2003.
  4. Enrico Perotti & Paolo Volpin, 2004. "Lobbying on Entry," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-088/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr., Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "Bank regulation and supervision : what works best?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2725, The World Bank.
  6. Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2002. "The Political Economy of Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3231, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. M. Pagano & P. F. Volpin, 2005. "Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 841-868, 04.
  8. Heinemann, Friedrich & Schüler, Martin, 2002. "A Stigler View on Banking Supervision," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-66, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  9. Stanley Fischer, 2003. "Financial crises and reform of the international financial system," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 1-37, March.
  10. repec:dgr:uvatin:2004088 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1137-1158, September.
  12. Perotti, Enrico C & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2003. "The Political Economy of Bank and Equity Dominance," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3914, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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