Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality, thus segmenting the market for industrial location. Regions that compete on infrastructure quality have an incentive to increase the degree of differentiation between them. This places an upper bound on the number of regions successfully able to participate in the location market, and limits the dissipation of regional surplus through Tiebout competition. It indicates a process of fiscal agglomeration, through which regional concentrations arise, which does not depend on the circular causation underlying much of the recent literature on economic geography.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
3109.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Government Policy R12 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography) R58 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Policy
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Black, Dan A & Hoyt, William H, 1989.
"Bidding for Firms,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1249-56, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)