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Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence

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Author Info
Ehrhart, Karl-Martin
Gardner, Roy J
Keser, Claudia
von Hagen, Jürgen

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Abstract

This Paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. We show, using structurally induced equilibrium theory, that this need not be the case. To test the implications for budget processes of structurally induced equilibrium theory, we conduct a series of experiments. The evidence from these experiments supports the predictions of structurally induced equilibrium theory, both at the aggregate and at the individual subject level.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2661.

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Date of creation: Jan 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2661

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Related research
Keywords: Budget Processes Experimental Economics Structurally Induced Equilibrium

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Claudia Keser & Roy Gardner, 1999. "Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 241-252. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1996. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," IMF Working Papers 96/52, International Monetary Fund.
    Other versions:
  3. Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1555, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," NBER Working Papers 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Eckel, Catherine & Holt, Charles A, 1989. "Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committee Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 763-73, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Marcel Boyer, 1999. "Les Expos, l'OSM, les universités, les hôpitaux : Le coût d'un déficit de 400 000 emplois au Québec = Expos, Montreal Symphony Orchestra, Universities, Hospitals: The Cost of a 400,000-Job Shortf," CIRANO Papers 99c-01, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jürgen von Hagen & Ian Harden, 1996. "Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline," IMF Working Papers 96/78, International Monetary Fund.
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  8. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Properties of a measure of predictive success," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 153-167, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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