Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk-neutral agent
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) with number 8624.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1986
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Guesnerie, Roger & Picard, Pierre & Rey, Patrick, 1989. "Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 807-823, April.
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