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Environmental innovation policy and international competition

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Author Info
Carlo Carraro
Domenico Siniscalco

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Abstract

We consider one polluting industry in an open economy. The national government implements a policy of industrial pollution control, by inducing appropriate technological innovation to reduce toxic emissions. The emission-reducing innovations are developed through firm-specific costly investments. Under different hypotheses on market structure (perfect competition, Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly), international competition forces the national government to subsidize innovation. The appropriate subsidy scheme varies according to the information available to the government and according to market structure. If information is asymmetric, the subsidy must include the information premium necessary to separate different types of firms. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00338242
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Publisher Info
Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental & Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 2 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 183-200
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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:2:y:1992:i:2:p:183-200

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Related research
Keywords: Pollution control; environmental innovation; international competition; subsidies; asymmetric information; self-selection;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-75, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Downing, Paul B. & White, Lawrence J., 1986. "Innovation in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 18-29, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Baron, David P., 1985. "Regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 211-231, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Picard, Pierre, 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 305-331, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ziesemer,Thomas, 2000. "Reconciling Environmental Policy with Employment, International Competitiveness and Participation Requirements," Research Memoranda 022, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Erik Verhoef & Peter Nijkamp, 1997. "The Adoption of Energy Efficiency Enhancing Technologies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-077/3, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. Henry van Egteren & R. Smith, 2002. "Environmental Regulations Under Simple Negligence or Strict Liability," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(4), pages 367-394, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz & M. Begona Garzon, 2000. "Environmental Standards, Wage Incomes and the Location of Polluting Firms (I)," BILTOKI 200004, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística). [Downloadable!]
  5. Carlo Carraro, 1998. "New Economic Theories," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 365-381, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Olivier Cadot & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 1995. "Innovation Under the Threat of Stricter Environmental Standards," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-11, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  7. Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 1997. "Pollution Accumulation and Firm Incentives to Accelerate Technological Change Under Uncertain Private Benefits," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(3), pages 285-300, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rinaldo Brau & C. Carraro, 2004. "The economic analysis of voluntary approaches to environmental protection. A survey," Working Paper CRENoS 200420, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia. [Downloadable!]
  9. Yuquing Xing & Charles Kolstad, 2002. "Do Lax Environmental Regulations Attract Foreign Investment?," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Jiunn-Rong Chiou & Jin-Li Hu, 2001. "Environmental Research Joint Ventures under Emission Taxes," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(2), pages 129-146, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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