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Why Not Fully Spend a Conditional Block Grant?

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  • Riemer Faber

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  • Pierre Koning

Abstract

This CPB Discussion Paper studies a conditional block grant that Dutch municipalities receive for welfare-to-work programs. Many municipalities do not fully use this grant, although programs are beneficial for them. We argue that municipalities incur expenses to use the grant. If these costs are substantial, then it is optimal not to fully use the grant. Based on municipality-specific data on grants and actual expenditures, we estimate that municipalities have to add about 90 cents from their own resources to spend 1 euro of the grant. As a result, the conditional block grant is de facto a closed-ended matching grant. � � � �

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its series CPB Discussion Paper with number 213.

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Date of creation: Jun 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cpb:discus:213

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  1. Bernd Huber & Marco Runkel, 2006. "Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants Under Asymmetric Information," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 25-41, January.
  2. Gordon, Nora, 2004. "Do federal grants boost school spending? Evidence from Title I," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 1771-1792, August.
  3. David E. Card & Jochen Kluve & Andrea Weber, 2009. "Active Labor Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta-analysis," NRN working papers 2009-02, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  4. Singhal, Monica, 2006. "Special Interest Groups and the Allocation of Public Funds," Working Paper Series rwp06-004, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  5. Cashel-Cordo, P. & Craig, S.G., 1988. "The Public Sector Impact Of International Resource Transfers," Papers 24, Houston - Department of Economics.
  6. Craig Volden, 2007. "Intergovernmental Grants: A Formal Model of Interrelated National and Subnational Political Decisions," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 209-243, Spring.
  7. Pierre Koning, 2009. "Contracting welfare-to-work services: use and usefulness," CPB Discussion Paper 135, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  8. Alesha E. Doan & Deborah R. McFarlane, 2012. "Saying No to Abstinence-Only Education: An Analysis of State Decision-Making," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(4), pages 613-635, October.
  9. Robin Boadway & Anwar Shah, 2007. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers : Principles and Practice," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7171, October.
  10. Daniel Bergvall & Claire Charbit & Dirk-Jan Kraan & Olaf Merk, 2006. "Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralised Public Spending," OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism 3, OECD Publishing.
  11. Benedicta Marzinotto, 2011. "A European fund for economic revival in crisis countries," Policy Contributions 504, Bruegel.
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Cited by:
  1. Koning, Pierre, 2013. "Making Work Pay for the Indebted: The Effect of Debt Services on the Exit Rates of Unemployed Individuals," IZA Discussion Papers 7873, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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