Network financing with two-part and single tariff
AbstractThis paper compares two types of access pricing: a two-part tariff where the fixed part aims to cover (part of) the network's fixed cost and the variable part covers the network's usage costs and a single tariff where both the usage and (part of) the infrastructure costs are covered by a per-unit access charge. It compares how the regulator trades-off the degree of competition induced by the access charges and the network financing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2005034.
Date of creation: 00 May 2005
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
access pricing market structure; network ﬁnancin;
Other versions of this item:
- GAUTIER, Axel, . "Network financing with two-part and single tariffs," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1885, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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