We consider a Cournot Oligopoly market of firms possessing increasing returns to scale technologies. It is shown that an external regulating agency can increase total social welfare without running a deficit. It offers to subsidize one firm an amount which depends on the output level of that firm. The firms bid for this contract and the regulator collects the highest bid and subsidizes the highest bidding firm. It is shown that there exists a subsidy schedule such that (i) The regulator breaks even (namely the winning bid equals the total subsidy) (ii) The winning firm obtains zero net profit and charges a price equal to its average cost (iii) Every other firm willingly exit the market and (iv) Market price decreases, consumers are better off and total welfare improves.
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